Weak Pseudo-Rationalizability

This paper generalizes rationalizability of a choice function by a single acyclic binary relation to rationalizability by a set of such relations. Rather than selecting those options in a menu that are maximal with respect to a single binary relation, a weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice function selects those options that are maximal with respect to at least one binary relation in a given set. I characterize the class of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions in terms of simple functional properties. This result also generalizes Aizerman and Malishevski's characterization of pseudo-rationalizable choice functions, that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of total orders

Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting

For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No

Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity

This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point that we make by drawing an analogy with de Finetti's argument against mandating countable additivity. Having presented the best version of the Orgulity Argument, our second aim is to develop a reply to it. We extend Elga's idea of appealing to finitely additive probability to show that the challenge posed by the Orgulity Argument can be met

Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence

Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also show that such sets converge to a shared, maximally informed opinion. Convergence to a maximally informed opinion is a (weak) Jeffrey conditioning analogue of Bayesian “convergence to the truth” for conditional probabilities. Finally, we demonstrate the philosophical significance of our study by detailing applications to the topics of dynamic coherence, imprecise probabilities, and probabilistic opinion pooling

Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?

Given the role consensus is supposed to play in the social aspects of inquiry and deliberation, it is important that we may always identify a consensus as the basis of joint inquiry and deliberation. However, it turns out that if we think of an agent revising her beliefs to reach a consensus, then, on the received view of belief revision, AGM belief revision theory, certain simple and compelling consensus positions are not always available

A Hyper-Relation Characterization of Weak Pseudo-Rationalizability

I provide a characterization of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions---that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of acyclic relations---in terms of hyper-relations satisfying certain properties. For those hyper-relations Nehring calls extended preference relations, the central characterizing condition is weaker than (hyper-relation) transitivity but stronger than (hyper-relation) acyclicity. Furthermore, the relevant type of hyper-relation can be represented as the intersection of a certain class of its extensions. These results generalize known, analogous results for path independent choice functions

Conditional choice with a vacuous second tier

This paper studies a generalization of rational choice theory. I briefly review the motivations that Helzner gives for his conditional choice construction (2013). Then, I focus on the important class of conditional choice functions with vacuous second tiers. This class is interesting for both formal and philosophical reasons. I argue that this class makes explicit one of conditional choice's normative motivations in terms of an account of neutrality advocated within a certain tradition in decision theory. The observations recorded several of which are generalizations of central results in the standard theory of rational choice are intended to provide further insight into how conditional choice generalizes the standard account and are offered as additional evidence of the fruitfulness of the conditional choice framework

Morphology investigation on direct current pulsed gas tungsten arc welded additive layer manufactured Ti6Al4V alloy

The effects of pulsed gas tungsten arc weldingparameters on the morphology of additive layer manufacturedTi6Al4V has been investigated in this study. Thepeak/ base current ratio and pulse frequency are found tohave no significant effect on the refinement of prior betagrain size. However, it is found that the wire feed ratehas a considerable effect on the prior beta grainrefinement at a given heat input. This is due to the extrawire input being able to supply many heterogeneousnucleation sites and also results in a negative temperaturegradient in the front of the liquidus which blocks thecolumnar growth and changes the columnar growth toequiaixal growth

Distention for Sets of Probabilities

A prominent pillar of Bayesian philosophy is that, relative to just a few constraints, priors “wash out” in the limit. Bayesians often appeal to such asymptotic results as a defense against charges of excessive subjectivity. But, as Seidenfeld and coauthors observe, what happens in the short run is often of greater interest than what happens in the limit. They use this point as one motivation for investigating the counterintuitive short run phenomenon of dilation since, it is alleged, “dilation contrasts with the asymptotic merging of posterior probabilities reported by Savage (1954) and by Blackwell and Dubins (1962)” (Herron et al., 1994). A partition dilates an event if, relative to every cell of the partition, uncertainty concerning that event increases. The measure of uncertainty relevant for dilation, however, is not the same measure that is relevant in the context of results concerning whether priors wash out or “opinions merge.” Here, we explicitly investigate the short run behavior of the metric relevant to merging of opinions. As with dilation, it is possible for uncertainty (as gauged by this metric) to increase relative to every cell of a partition. We call this phenomenon distention. It turns out that dilation and distention are orthogonal phenomena

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities

The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution (Madansky 44; Lehrer and Wagner 34; McConway Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76(374), 410--414, 45; Bordley Management Science, 28(10), 1137--1148, 5; Genest et al. The Annals of Statistics, 487--501, 21; Genest and Zidek Statistical Science, 114--135, 23; Mongin Journal of Economic Theory, 66(2), 313--351, 46; Clemen and Winkler Risk Analysis, 19(2), 187--203, 7; Dietrich and List 14; Herzberg Theory and Decision, 1--19, 28). We argue that this assumption is not always in order. We show how to extend the canonical mathematical framework for pooling to cover pooling with imprecise probabilities (IP) by employing set-valued pooling functions and generalizing common pooling axioms accordingly. As a proof of concept, we then show that one IP construction satisfies a number of central pooling axioms that are not jointly satisfied by any of the standard pooling recipes on pain of triviality. Following Levi (Synthese, 62(1), 3--11, 39), we also argue that IP models admit of a much better philosophical motivation as a model of rational consensus